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￿By ￿ uncomputability￿I mean both that arising from (classical) recursion theoretic con-
siderations, and from those due to formal non-constructivities (in any sense of constructive
mathematics).
yQuite serendipitously, I am in the happy position of being able to pay long overdue
acknowledgements to four of my "fellow-invitees" at this meeting: Ann Condon, Barry Cooper,
Chico Doria and Karl Svozil - although they are, almost certainly, unaware of the kind of
ways in which I have bene￿tted from their wisdom and scholarship, over the years (cf. in
particular, [7], [8] and [44], respectively). Indeed, in the case of Barry Cooper, I am also
deeply indebted to his own distinguished teacher, R.L. Goodstein, whose works have had
a lasting in￿uence in the way I think about the kind of mathematics that is suitable for
mathematizing economics. In particular, it was from his outstanding calculus text ([14])
that I learned the felicitous phrase ￿ undecidable disjunction￿ , which was instrumental in my
understanding of the pernicious in￿uence of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem in algorithmic
mathematics and, a fortiori, in algorithmic economics. But, as always these days, it is to
Chico Doria and Stefano Zambelli that I owe most - without the slightest implications for the
remaining infelicities in the paper.
1Abstract
Economic theory, game theory and mathematical statistics have all increas-
ingly become algorithmic sciences. Computable Economics, Algorithmic Game
Theory ([28]) and Algorithmic Statistics ([13]) are frontier research subjects. All
of them, each in its own way, are underpinned by (classical) recursion theory ￿
and its applied branches, say computational complexity theory or algorithmic
information theory ￿and, occasionally, proof theory. These research paradigms
have posed new mathematical and metamathematical questions and, inadver-
tently, undermined the traditional mathematical foundations of economic the-
ory. A concise, but partial, pathway into these new frontiers is the subject
matter of this paper. Interpreting the core of mathematical economic theory to
be de￿ned by General Equilibrium Theory and Game Theory, a general ￿but
concise ￿analysis of the computable and decidable content of the implications
of these two areas are discussed. Issues at the frontiers of macroeconomics,
now dominated by Recursive Macroeconomic Theory1, are also tackled, albeit
ultra brie￿ y. The point of view adopted is that of classical recursion theory and
varieties of constructive mathematics.
JEL Classi￿cation Codes: C60, C63, C68, C70, C79
Key Words: General Equilibrium Theory, Game Theory, Recursive Macro-
economics, (Un)computability, (Un)decidability, Constructivity
1The quali￿cation ￿ recursive￿here has nothing to do with ￿ recursion theory￿ . Instead, this
is a reference to the mathematical formalizations of the rational economic agent￿ s intertem-
poral optimization problems, in terms of Markov Decision Processes, (Kalman) Filtering and
Dynamic Programming, where a kind of ￿ recursion￿is invoked in the solution methods. The
metaphor of the rational economic agent as a ￿ signal processor￿underpins the recursive macro-
economic paradigm.
21 A Mathematical and Metamathematical Pream-
ble
Distinguished pure mathematicians, applied mathematicians, philosophers and
physicists have, with the innocence of integrity and the objectivity of their
respective disciplines, observing the mathematical practice and analytical as-
sumptions of economists, have emulated the ￿ little child￿ in Hans Christian
Andersen￿ s evocative tale to exclaim similar obvious verities, from the point
of view of algorithmic mathematics. I have in mind the ￿ innocent￿ , but obvi-
ously potent, observations made by Michael Rabin ([34]), Hilary Putnam ([33])
Maury Osborne ([29]), Jacob Schwartz ([40]), Steve Smale ([41]), Glenn Shafer
& Vladimir Vovk ([38]) and David Ruelle ([35])2, each tackling an important
core issue in mathematical economics and ￿nding it less than adequate from a
serious mathematical and computable point of view ￿in addition to being con-
trived, even from the point of view of common sense economics3. Decidability in
games, uncomputability in rational choice, inappropriateness of real analysis in
the modelling of ￿nancial market dynamics, the gratuitous assumption of (topo-
logical) ￿x point formalizations in equilibrium economic theory, the question of
the algorithmic solvability of supply-demand (diophantine) equation systems,
￿nance theory without probability (but algorithmically), are some of the issues
these ￿ innocent￿pioneers raised, against the naked economic theoretic emperor.
I hasten to add that there were pioneers even within the ￿ citadel￿of economic
theory. Their contributions have been discussed and documented in various of
my writings over the past 20 years or so and, therefore, I shall not rehash that
part of the story here4. Su¢ ce it to mention just the more obvious pioneers
who emerged from within the ￿ citadel￿ : Peter Albin, Kenneth Arrow, Douglas
Bridges5, Alain Lewis, Herbert Scarf and Herbert Simon. Albin, Arrow, Lewis,
2In addition to the themes Ruelle broached in this ￿ Gibbs Lecture￿ , the ￿rst four, chapter 9
and the last four chapters of his elegant new book ([36]) are also relevant for the philosophical
underpinnings of this paper. Although the two Ruelle references are not directly related to
the subject matter of this paper, I include them because the mathematical themes of these
works are deeply relevant to my approach here.
3Discerning scholars would notice that I have not included the absolutely pioneering work
of Louis Bachelier in this list (cf. [9] or [12] for easily accessible English versions of Bachelier￿ s
ThØorie de la SpØculation). This is only because he did not raise issues of computability,
decidability and constructivity, that he could not possibly have done at the time he wrote,
even though Hilbert￿ s famous ￿ Paris Lecture￿was only ￿ve months away from when Bachelier
defended his remarkable doctoral dissertation ￿also in Paris.
4The absence of any detailed discussion of honest priorities from within the ￿ citadel￿in this
paper is also for reasons of space constraints.
5Douglas Bridges is, of course, a distinguished mathematician who has made fundamental
contributions - both at the research frontiers and at the level of cultured pedagogy - to con-
structive analysis, computability theory and their interdependence, too. However, I consider
his contributions to ￿ constructive economics￿to be at least as pioneering as Alain Lewis￿ s to
￿ computable economics￿ . Alas, neither the one nor the other seems to have made the slightest
di⁄erence to the orthodox, routine, practice of the mathematical economist.
3Scarf and Simon considered seriously, to a greater and lesser extent, the issue
of modelling economic behaviour, both in the case of individually rational and
in cases of strategically rational interactions, the place of formal computability
considerations and their implications. Bridges and Scarf were early contributors
to what may be called ￿ constructive economics￿ , complementing the ￿ computable
economics￿of the former contributors. Scarf, of course, straddled both divides,
without ￿surprisingly ￿providing a unifying underpinning in what I have come
to call ￿ algorithmic economics￿ 6.
Economic theory, at every level and at almost all frontiers - be it micro-
economics or macroeconomics, game theory or IO - is now almost irreversibly
dominated by computational, numerical7 and experimental considerations. Cu-
riously, though, none of the frontier emphasis from any one of these three points
of view - computational, numerical or experimental - is underpinned by the nat-
ural algorithmic mathematics of either computability theory or constructive
analysis8. In particular, the much vaunted ￿eld of Computable General Equi-
librium theory, with explicit claims that it is based on constructive and com-
putable foundations is neither the one, nor the other9. Similarly, Newclassical
Economics, the dominant strand in Macroeconomics, has as its formal core so-
called Recursive Macroeconomic Theory. The dominance of computational and
numerical analysis, powerfully underpinned by serious approximation theory, is
totally devoid of computable or constructive foundations.
The reasons for this paradoxical lack of interest in computability or construc-
tivity considerations, even while almost the whole of economic theory is almost
completely dominated by numerical, computational and experimental consid-
erations, are quite easy to discern: the reliance of every kind of mathematical
economics on real analysis for formalization. I shall not go into too many details
of this ￿ conjecture￿in this paper, but once again the interested reader is referred
to [49] and [51] for more comprehensive discussions and formal analysis (but see
also § 3, below).
Against this ￿ potted￿background of pioneering innocence and core issues,
the rest of this paper is structured as follows. Some of the key results on un-
computability and undecidability, mostly derived by this author are summarised
6In this paper I shall not discuss the place of computational complexity theory in economics,
which has an almost equally distinguished ancestry. I provide a fairly full discussion of the
role of computational complexity theory, from the point of view of algorithmic economics in
[52]
7By this I aim to refer to classical numerical analysis, which has only in recent years
shown tendencies of merging with computability theory - for example through the work of
Steve Smale and his many collaborators (cf. for example [2]). To the best of my knowledge
the foundational work in computable analysis and constructive analysis was never properly
integrated with classical numerical analysis.
8With the notable exception of the writings of the above mentioned pioneers, none of
whom work - or worked - in any of these three areas, as conceived and understood these days.
For excellent expositions of numerical and computational methods in economics, particularly
macroeconomics, see [4], [18] and [23].
9A complete and detailed analysis of the false claims ￿ from the point of view of com-
putability and constructivity ￿of the proponents and practitioners of CGE modelling is given
in my recent paper devoted explicitly to the topic (cf. [50]).
4in a fairly merciless telegraphic form (with adequate and detailed references to
sources) in the next section. In section 3 some remarks on the mathematical
underpinnings of these ￿ negative￿results are discussed and, again, stated in the
usual telegraphic form. The concluding section suggests a framework for in-
voking my ￿ version￿of unconventional computation models for mathematical
models of the economy.
Two distinguished pioneers of economic theory and, appropriately, national
income accounting, Kenneth Arrow and Richard Stone (in collaboration with
Alan Brown) ￿who also happened to be Nobel Laureates ￿almost delineated
the subject matter of what I have come to call Computable Economics. The
former conjectured, more than two decades ago, as a frontier research strategy
for the mathematical economic theorist, that:
"The next step in analysis, I would conjecture, is a more con-
sistent assumption of computability in the formulation of economic
hypothesis. This is likely to have its own di¢ culties because, of
course, not everything is computable, and there will be in this sense
an inherently unpredictable element in rational behavior."
[1]
Richard Stone (together with Alan Brown), speaking as an applied econo-
mist, grappling with the conundrums of adapting an economic theory formulated
in terms of a mathematics alien to the digital computer and to the nature of
the data10, confessed his own credo in characteristically perceptive terms11:
10
Maury Osborne, with the clarity that can only come from a rank outsider to
the internal paradoxes of the dissonance between economic theory and applied
economics, noted pungently:
"There are numerous other paradoxical beliefs of this society [of econo-
mists], consequent to the di⁄erence between discrete numbers .. in which data
is recorded, whereas the theoreticians of this society tend to think in terms of
real numbers. ...No matter how hard I looked, I never could see any actual
real [economic] data that showed that [these solid, smooth, lines of economic
theory] ... actually could be observed in nature. ...... At this point a beady
eyed Chicken Little might ... say, ￿ Look here, you can￿ t have solid lines on that
picture because there is always a smallest unit of money ... and in addition there
is always a unit of something that you buy. ..[I]n any event we should have just
whole numbers of some sort on [the supply-demand] diagram on both axes. The
lines should be dotted. ... Then our mathematician Zero will have an objection
on the grounds that if we are going to have dotted lines instead of solid lines on
the curve then there does not exist any such thing as a slope, or a derivative, or
a logarithmic derivative either. .... .
If you think in terms of solid lines while the practice is in terms of dots
and little steps up and down, this misbelief on your part is worth, I would say




Prefaced, elegantly and appositely, with a typically telling observation by
5"Our approach is quantitative because economic life is largely
concerned with quantities. We use [digital] computers because they
are the best means that exist for answering the questions we ask. It
is our responsibility to formulate the questions and get together the
data which the computer needs to answer them."
[3], p.viii
Economic analysis, as practised by the mathematical economist ￿whether as
a microeconomist or a macroeconomist, or even as a game theorist or an IO theo-
rist ￿continues, with princely unconcern for these conjectures and conundrums,
to be mired in, and underpinned by, conventional real analysis. Therefore, it is
a ￿ cheap￿exercise to extract, discover and display varieties of uncomputabilities,
undecidabilities and non-constructivities in the citadel of economic theory. Any-
one with a modicum of expertise in recursion theory, constructive analysis or
even nonstandard analysis in its constructive modes, would ￿nd, in any reading
from these more algorithmically oriented perspectives, the citadel of economic
theory, game theory and IO replete with uncomputabilities, undecidabilities and
non-constructivities ￿even elements of incompleteness.
Against this ￿ potted￿background of pioneering innocence and core issues, the
rest of this paper is structured as follows. Some of the key results on uncom-
putability and undecidability, mostly derived by this author, are summarized
in a fairly merciless telegraphic form (with adequate and detailed references
to sources) in the next section. In section 3 some remarks on the mathemati-
cal underpinnings of these ￿ negative￿results are discussed and, again, stated in
the usual telegraphic form. The concluding section suggests a framework for
invoking my ￿ version￿of unconventional computation models for mathematical
models of the economy.
2 Uncomputability and Undecidability in Eco-
nomic Theory
Although many of the results described in this section may appear to have been
obtained ￿ cheaply￿￿in the sense mentioned above ￿my own reasons for having
worked with the aim of locating uncomputabilities, non-constructivities and
undecidabilities in core areas of economic theory have always been a combination
Samuel Johnson: "Nothing amuses more harmlessly than computation, and
nothing is oftener applicable to real business or speculative enquiries. A thou-
sand stories which the ignorant tell, and believe, die away at once when the
computist takes them in his grip"
ibid, p.vii
Surely, this is simply a more literary expression of that famous credo of
Leibniz:
"..[W]hen a controversy arises, disputation will no more be needed between
two philosophers than between two computers. It will su¢ ce that, pen in hand,
they sit down ... and say to each other: Let us calculate."
[19]
6of intellectual curiosity ￿along the lines conjectured by Arrow, above ￿ and the
desire to make the subject meaningfully quantitative ￿in the sense suggested
by Stone (op.cit). In the process an explicit research strategy has also emerged,
on the strategy of making economic theory consistently algorithmic. The most
convincing and admirably transparent example of this research strategy is the
one adopted by Michael Rabin to transform the celebrated Gale-Stewart Game
to an Algorithmic Game and, then, to characterise its e⁄ective content. A
full discussion of this particular episode in the development of Computable
Economics is given in [46] and [48], chapter 7. However, the various subsections
below simply report some of the results I have obtained, on uncomputability,
non-constructivity and undecidability in economic theory, without, in each case,
describing the background motivation, the precise research and proof strategy
that was developed to obtain the result and the full extent of the implications
for Computable Economics.
2.1 Undecidability (and Uncomputability) of Maximizing
Choice
All of mathematical economics and every kind of orthodox game theory rely
on some form of formalized notion of individually ￿ rational behaviour￿Two key
results that I derived more than two decades ago, are the following, stated as
theorems:
Theorem 1 Rational economic agents in the sense of economic theory are
equivalent to suitably indexed Turing Machines; i.e, decision processes imple-
mented by rational economic agents - viz., choice behaviour - is equivalent to
the computing behaviour of a suitably indexed Turing Machine.
Put another way, this theorem states that the process of rational choice by an
economic agent is equivalent to the computing activity of a suitably programmed
Turing Machine.
Proof. Essentially by construction from ￿rst principles (no non-constructive
assumptions are invoked). See [47].
An essential, but mathematically trivial, implication of this Theorem is the
following result:
Theorem 2 Rational choice, understood as maximizing choice, is undecidable.
Proof. The procedure is to show, again by construction, that preference order-
ing is e⁄ectively undecidable. See [48], §3.3 for the details.
Remark 3 These kinds of results are the reasons for the introduction of for-
malized concepts of bounded rationality and satis￿cing by Herbert Simon. Cur-
rent practice, particularly in varieties of experimental game theory, to identify
boundedly rational choice with the computing activities of a Finite Automaton
are completely contrary to the theoretical constructs and cognitive underpinnings
of Herbert Simon￿ s framework. The key mistake in current practice is to divorce
7the de￿nition of bounded rationality from that of satis￿cing. Simon￿ s framework
does not refer to the orthodox maximizing paradigm; it refers to the recursion
theorist￿s and the combinatorial optimizer￿ s framework of decision procedures.
2.2 Computable and Decidable Paradoxes of Excess De-
mand Function
2.2.1 Algorithmic Undecidability of a Computable General Equilib-
rium
The excess demand function plays a crucial role in all aspects of computable
general equilibrium theory and, indeed, in the foundation of microeconomics.
Its signi￿cance in computable general equilibrium theory is due to the crucial
role it plays in what has come to be called Uzawa￿ s Equivalence Theorem (cf.
[42], §11.4) ￿the equivalence between a Walrasian Equilibrium Existence The-
orem (WEET) and the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem. The ￿nesse in one half
of the equivalence theorem, i.e., that WEET implies the Brouwer ￿x point the-
orem, is to show the feasibility of devising a continuous excess demand function,
X(p), satisfying Walras￿Law (and homogeneity), from an arbitrary continuous
function, say f(:) : S ! S, such that the equilibrium price vector, p￿, implied
by X(p) is also the ￿x point for f(:), from which it is ￿ constructed￿ .
I am concerned, ￿rstly, with the recursion theoretic status of X(p). Is this
function computable for arbitrary p 2 S? Obviously, if it is, then there is
no need to use the alleged constructive procedure to determine the Brouwer ￿x
point (or any of the other usual topological ￿x points that are invoked in general
equilibrium theory and CGE Modelling) to locate the economic equilibrium
implied by WEET.
The key step in proceeding from a given, arbitrary, f(:) : S ! S to an excess
























) ￿ pi￿(p) (3)
i.e.,
X(p) = f(p) ￿ ￿(p)p (4)
8I claim that the procedure that leads to the de￿nition of (3) [or, equivalently,
(4)] to determine p￿is provably undecidable. In other words, the crucial scalar
in (1) cannot be de￿ned recursion theoretically (and, a fortiori, constructively)
to e⁄ectivize a sequence of projections that would ensure convergence to the
equilibrium price vector.
Clearly, given any p 2 S, all the elements on the r.h.s of (1) and (2) seem to
be well de￿ned. However, f(p) is not necessarily computable (nor meaningfully
constructive) for arbitrary p 2 S. Restricting the choice of f(:) to the partial
recursive functions may most obviously violate the assumption of Walras￿Law.
Therefore, I shall show that it is impossible to devise an algorithm to de￿ne (3)
[or (4)] for an arbitrary f(p), such that the equilibrium p￿ for the de￿ned excess
demand function is also the ￿x point of f(:). If it were possible, then the famous
Halting Problem for Turing Machines can be solved, which is an impossibility.
Theorem 4 X(p￿), as de￿ned in (3) [or (4)] above is undecidable; i.e., cannot
be determined algorithmically.
Proof. Suppose, contrariwise, there is an algorithm which, given an arbitrary
f(:) : S ! S, determines X(p￿). This means, therefore, that the given algo-
rithm determines the equilibrium p￿ implied by WEET. In other words, given
the arbitrary initial conditions p 2 S and f(:) : S ! S, the assumption of the
existence of an algorithm to determine X(p￿) implies that its halting con￿gura-
tions are decidable. But this violates the undecidability of the Halting Problem
for Turing Machines. Hence, the assumption that there exists an algorithm to
determine - i.e., to construct - X(p￿) is untenable.
Remark 5 The algorithmically important content of the proof is the following.
Starting with an arbitrary continuous function mapping the simplex into itself
and an arbitrary price vector, the existence of an algorithm to determine X(p￿)
entails the feasibility of a procedure to choose price sequences in some deter-
mined way to check for p￿ and to halt when such a price vector is found. Now,
the two scalars, ￿ and ￿ are determined once f(:) and p are given. But an ar-
bitrary initial price vector p, except for ￿ukes, will not be the equilibrium price
vector p￿. Therefore the existence of an algorithm would imply that there is a
systematic procedure to choose price vectors, determine the values of f(:), ￿ and
￿ and the associated excess demand vector X(p;￿;￿). At each determination
of such an excess demand vector, a projection of the given, arbitrary, f(p), on
the current X(p), for the current p, will have to be tried. This procedure must
continue till the projection for a price vector results in excess demands that
vanish for some price. Unless severe recursive constraints are imposed on price
sequences - constraints that will make very little economic sense - such a test is
algorithmically infeasible. In other words, given an arbitrary, continuous, f(:),
there is no procedure - algorithm (constructive or recursion theoretic) - by which
a sequence of price vectors, p 2 S, can be systematically tested to ￿nd p￿.
Corollary 6 The Recursive Competitive Equilibrium of New Classical Macro-
economics ￿Recursive Macroeconomic Theory ￿is uncomputable.
9Remark 7 The proof procedure is almost exactly analogous to the one used
above to show the recursive undecidability of a computable general equilibrium ￿
with one signi￿cant di⁄erence. Instead of using the unsolvability of the Halting
problem for Turing Machines to derive the contradiction, I use a version of
Rice￿ s Theorem.
2.2.2 Recursive Undecidability of the Excess Demand Function
The nature of economic data and the parameters underpinning the mechanisms
generating the data ￿as noted by Stone and Osborne, if any substantiation
of the obvious must be invoked via the wisdom of eminence ￿ should imply
that the excess demand function is a Diophantine relation. Suppose we take
economic reality, Stone, Osborne and Smale seriously assume that all variables
and parameters de￿ning the excess demand functions are, in fact, integer or
rational valued (with the former, in addition, being non-negative, as well).
Indeed, Smale has brilliantly articulated the perplexity of the Arrow-Debreu
￿ subversion￿of the classic problem of supply-demand equilibrium as a system of
equations to be solved for non-negative valued, rational-number variables, into
a system of inequalities whose consistency is proved by blind appeals to non-
constructive ￿x point theorems and, thereby, an existence of a set of equilibrium
prices is asserted:
"We return to the subject of equilibrium theory. The existence
theory of the static approach is deeply rooted to the use of the mathe-
matics of ￿xed point theory. Thus one step in the liberation from the
static point of view would be to use a mathematics of a di⁄erent
kind. Furthermore, proofs of ￿xed point theorems traditionally use
di¢ cult ideas of algebraic topology, and this has obscured the eco-
nomic phenomena underlying the existence of equilibria. Also the
economic equilibrium problem presents itself most directly and with
the most tradition not as a ￿xed point problem, but as an equation,
supply equals demand. Mathematical economists have trans-
lated the problem of solving this equation into a ￿xed point
problem.
I think it is fair to say that for the main existence problems in the
theory of economic equilibrium, one can now bypass the ￿xed
point approach and attack the equations directly to give
existence of solutions, with a simpler kind of mathematics
and even mathematics with dynamic and algorithmic overtones."
[41], p.290; bold emphasis added.
To ￿ attack the equations directly,￿taking into account the obvious constraints
on variables and parameters in economics - i.e., that the variables have to be
non-negative, rational numbers and the parameters at least the latter (and if
they are not the former, then there are feasible transformations to make them
so, cf. [24], chapter 1) ￿is actually a very simple matter. I shall only indicate
10the skeleton of such an approach here. Full details are available in the author￿ s
other writings.
Now, dividing the vector of parameters and variables characterizing the ex-
cess demand function X into two parts, a vector a of parameters and the vector
of prices, p, we can write a relation of the form (in supply-demand equilibrium)
X (a1;a2;:::::;an;x1;x2;:::;xm) = 0
where:
De￿nition 8 X is a polynomial with integer (or rational number) coe¢ cients
with respect to the parameters a1;a2;:::::;an and variables x1;x2;:::;xm (which
are also non-negative) and is called a parametric Diophantine equation.
De￿nition 9 X in De￿nition 8 de￿nes a set z of the parameters for which
there are values of the unknowns such that:
ha1;a2;:::;ani 2 F () 9x1;x2;:::;xm [X (a1;a2;:::;an;x1;x2;:::;xm) = 0]
Loosely speaking, the relations denoted in the above two de￿nitions can be
called Diophantine representations. Then sets, such as z, having a Diophantine
representation, are called simply Diophantine. With this much terminology at
hand, it is possible to state the fundamental problem of a Diophantine system
of excess demand equations as follows:
Problem 10 A set, say ha1;a2;:::::;ani 2 F, is given. Determine if this set is
Diophantine. If it is, ￿nd a Diophantine representation for it.
Of course, the set z may be so structured as to possess equivalence classes of
properties, P and relations, R:Then it is possible also to talk, analogously, about
a Diophantine representation of a Property P or a Diophantine representation
of a Relation R: For example, in the latter case we have:
R(a1;a2;:::::;an) () 9x1;x2;:::;xm [X (a1;a2;:::::;an;x1;x2;:::;xm) = 0]
Next, how can we talk about the solvability of a Diophantine representa-
tion of the excess demand relation? This is where undecidability (and uncom-
putability) will enter ￿through a remarkable connection with recursion theory,
summarized in the next Proposition:
Proposition 11 Given any parametric Diophantine equation, X, it is possible
to construct a Turing Machine, M, such that M will eventually Halt, begin-
ning with a representation of the parametric n-tuple, ha1;a2;:::::;ani, i⁄ X in
De￿nition 9 is solvable for the unknowns, x1;x2;:::;xm.
But, then, given the famous result on the Unsolvability of the Halting prob-
lem for Turing Machines, we are forced to come to terms with the algorithmic
unsolvability of the excess demand function as a Diophantine equations.
112.3 Nonconstructivity of Welfare Theorems
Let me conclude this section by showing, in a very general way, the role played
by the Hahn-Banach Theorem in proving the crucial ￿ Second Welfare Theorem￿
in economics. I shall refer to the way it is presented, proved and discussed in [22]
(although I could equally well have chosen the slightly simpler and clearer ex-
position in [42]). The Second Welfare Theorem establishes the proposition that
any Pareto optimum can, for suitably chosen prices, be supported as a competi-
tive equilibrium. The role of the Hahn-Banach theorem in this proposition is in
establishing the suitable price system.
Lucas and Stokey state ￿ their￿version of the Hahn-Banach Theorem in the
following way12:
Theorem 12 Geometric form of the Hahn-Banch Theorem.
Let S be a normed vector space; let A;B ￿ S be convex sets. Assume:
(a). Either B has an interior point and A \ ￿ B = ;,
￿
￿ B : closure of B
￿
;
(b). Or, S is ￿nite dimensional and A \ B = ;;
Then: 9 a continuous linear functional ￿, not identically zero on S; and a
constant c s.t:
￿(y) ￿ c ￿ ￿(x); 8x 2 A and 8y 2 B:
Next, I state the economic part of the problem in merciless telegraphic form
as follows:
There areI consumers, indexed i = 1;::::;I;
S is a vector space with the usual norm;
Consumer i chooses from commodity set Xi ￿ S, evaluated according to the
utility function ui : Xi ! <;
There are j ￿rms, indexed j = 1;::::;J;
Choice by ￿rm j is from the technology possibility set, Yj ￿ S; (evaluated
along pro￿t maximizing lines);
The mathematical structure is represented by the following absolutely stan-
dard assumptions:
1. 8i;Xi is convex;
2. 8i; if x;x0 2 Ci;ui(x) > ui(x0); and if ￿ 2 (0;1); then ui [￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)x0] >
ui(x0);
3. 8i;ui : Xi ! < is continuous;
12Essentially, the ￿ classical￿mathematician￿ s Hahn-Banach theorem guarantees the exten-
sion of a bounded linear functional, say ￿, from a linear subset Y of a separable normed linear
space, X, to a functional, ￿; on the whole space X, with exact preservation of norm; i.e.,
j￿j = j￿j. The constructive Hahn-Banach theorem, on the other hand, cannot deliver this
pseudo-exactness and preserves the extension as: j￿j ￿ j￿j+", 8" > 0: The role of the positive
" in the constructive version of the Hahn-Banach theorem is elegantly discussed by Nerode,
Metakides and Constable in their beautiful piece in the Bishop Memorial Volume ([27], pp.
85-91). Again, compare the di⁄erence between the ￿ classical￿IVT and the constructive IVT
to get a feel for the role of ":
124. The set Y =
P
j Yj is convex;
5. Either the set Y =
P
j Yj has an interior point, or S is ￿nite dimensional;
Then, the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics is:











Optimal allocation; assume, for some h 2
￿￿ 1;:::::￿ I
￿
;9^ xh 2 Xh with uh(^ xh) >
uh(x0
h): Then 9 a continuous linear functional ￿ : S ! <; not identically zero
on S, s.t:
(a). 8i;x 2 Xi and ui(x) ￿ ui(x0) =) ￿(x) ￿ ￿(x0
i);
(b). 8j;y 2 Yj =) ￿(j) ￿ ￿(y0
i );
Anyone can see, as anyone would have seen and has seen for the last 70
years, that an economic problem has been ￿ mangled￿into a mathematical form
to conform to the structure and form of a mathematical theorem. This was the
case with the way Nash formulated his problems; the way the Arrow-Debreu
formulation of the general equilibrium problem was made famous; and legions
of others.
It is a pure mechanical procedure to verify that the assumptions of the
economic problem satisfy the conditions of the Hahn-Banach Theorem and,
therefore, the powerful Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics is
￿ proved￿ 13.
The Hahn-Banach theorem does have a constructive version, but only on
subspaces of separable normed spaces. The standard, ￿ classical￿version, valid
on nonseparable normed spaces depends on Zorn￿ s Lemma which is, of course,
equivalent to the axiom of choice, and is therefore, non-constructive14.
Schechter￿ s perceptive comment on the constructive Hahn-Banach theorem is
the precept I wish economists with a numerical, computational or experimental
bent should keep in mind (ibid, p. 135; italics in original; emphasis added).:
"[O]ne of the fundamental theorems of classical functional analysis
is the Hahn-Banach Theorem; ... some versions assert the existence
of a certain type of linear functional on a normed space X. The
theorem is inherently nonconstructive, but a constructive proof can
be given for a variant involving normed spaces X that are separable
￿i.e., normed spaces that have a countable dense subset. Little is
lost in restricting one￿ s attention to separable spaces15, for in applied
13To the best of my knowledge an equivalence between the two, analogous to that between
the Brouwer ￿x point theorem and the Walrasian equilibrium existence theorem, proved by
Uzawa ([45]), has not been shown.
14This is not a strictly accurate statement, although this is the way many advanced books
on functional analysis tend to present the Hahn-Banach theorem. For a reasonably accessible
discussion of the precise dependency of the Hahn-Banach theorem on the kind of axiom of
choice (i.e., whether countable axiom of choice or the axiom of dependent choice), see [26].
For an even better and fuller discussion of the Hahn-Banach theorem, both from ￿ classical￿
and a constructive points of view, Schechter￿ s encyclopedic treatise is unbeatable ([37]).
15However, it must be remembered that Ishihara, [17], has shown the constructive validity
of the Hahn-Banach theorem also for uniformly convex spaces.
13math most or all normed spaces of interest are separable. The con-
structive version of the Hahn-Banach Theorem is more complicated,
but it has the advantage that it actually ￿nds the linear functional
in question."
So, one may be excused for wondering, why economists rely on the ￿ classical￿
versions of these theorems? They are devoid of numerical meaning and compu-
tational content. Why go through the rigmarole of ￿rst formalizing in terms of
numerically meaningless and computationally invalid concepts to then seek im-
possible and intractable approximations to determine uncomputable equilibria,
undecidably e¢ cient allocations, and so on?
Thus my question is: why should an economist force the economic domain
to be a normed vector space? Why not a separable normed vector space? Isn￿ t
this because of pure ignorance of constructive mathematics and a carelessness
about the nature and scope of fundamental economic entities and the domain
over which they should be de￿ned?
2.4 None⁄ectivity of Games
The most celebrated exercise in Computable Economics or what has recently
come to be called Algorithmic Game Theory is Michael Rabin￿ s famous result:
Theorem 14 (Rabin, 1957) There are games in which the player who in
theory can always win cannot do so in practice because it is impossible to
supply him with e⁄ective instructions regarding how he should play in order
to win.
Rabin￿ s strategy to obtain this result is the paradigmatic example of what
I conceive to be the typical research program of a Computable Economist. Es-
sentially, the idea is to consider any formal, orthodox, game theoretic example
and strip it away of all non-e⁄ective considerations and, then, ask whether the
remaining sca⁄olding is capable of being algorithmically decidable in an em-
pirically meaningful sense. A complete description and explanation of Rabin￿ s
strategy is fully discussed in [46].
But at the time I ￿rst studied Rabin￿ s example ￿about twenty years ago ￿
and extracted his implicit research strategy as a paradigmatic example for the
work of a Computable Economist, I missed an important aspect: its place in a
particular tradition of game theory. It was only in very recent times that I have
been able to place it in the original tradition of game theory ￿the tradition
that began with Zermelo, before it was ￿ subverted￿by the von Neumann-Nash
subjective approach which dominates all current frontiers of research in game
theory, at least in the citadel of economic theory (including its computational
and experimental branches). My starting point for the tradition that came
to a transitory completion, therefore, would be Zermelo￿ s celebrated lecture of
1912 ([54]) and his pioneering formulation of an adversarial situation into an
alternating game and its subsequent formulation and solution as a mini-max
14problem by Jan Mycielski in terms of alternating the existential and universal
quanti￿ers.
The Zermelo game has no subjective component of any sort. It is an entirely
objective game of perfect information, although it is often considered part of
the orthodox game theoretic tradition. Let me describe the gist of the kind of
game considered by Zermelo, ￿rst. In a 2-player game of perfect information,
alternative moves are made by the two players, say A and B. The game, say
as in Chess, is played by each of the players ￿ moving￿one of a ￿nite number of
counters available to him or her, according to speci￿ed rules, along a ￿ tree￿- in
the case of Chess, of course, on a board of ￿xed dimension, etc. Player A, say,
makes the ￿rst move (perhaps determined by a chance mechanism) and places
one of the counters, say a0 2 A0; on the designated ￿ tree￿at some allowable
position (again, for evocative purposes, say as in Chess or any other similar
board game); player B, then, observes the move made by A - i.e., observes, with
perfect recall, the placement of the counter a1 - and makes the second move by
placing, say b1 2 B1; on an allowable position on the ￿ board￿ ; and so on. Let us
suppose these alternating choices terminate after Player B￿ s n ￿ th move; i.e.,
when bn 2 Bn has been placed in an appropriate place on the ￿ board￿ .
De￿nition 15 A play of such a game consists of a sequence of such alternative
moves by the two players
Suppose we label the alternating individual moves by the two players with
the natural numbers in such a way that:
1. The even numbers, say, a(0);a(2);:::::;a(n￿1) enumerate player A￿ s moves;
2. The odd numbers, say, b(1);b(3);:::::::;b(n) enumerate player B￿ s moves;
￿ Then, each (￿nite) play can be expressed as a sequence, say ￿, of
natural numbers.
Suppose we de￿ne the set ￿ as the set of plays which are wins for player A;
and, similarly, the set ￿ as the set of plays which are wins for player B.
De￿nition 16 A strategy is a function from any (￿nite) string of natural num-
bers as input generates a single natural number, say ￿, as an output.
De￿nition 17 A game is determined if one of the players has a winning
strategy; i.e., if either ￿ 2 ￿ or ￿ 2 ￿.
Theorem 18 Zermelo￿ s Theorem: 9 a winning strategy for player A, whatever
is the play chosen by B; and vice versa for B
Remark 19 This is Zermelo￿ s version of a minimax theorem in a perfect recall,
perfect information, game.
It is in connection with this result and the minimax form of it that Steinhaus
observed, with considerable perplexity:
15"[My] inability [to prove the minimax theorem] was a consequence
of the ignorance of Zermelo￿ s paper ([54]) in spite of its having been
published in 1913. .... J von Neumann was aware of the impor-
tance of the minimax principle (cf. [53]); it is, however, di¢ cult
to understand the absence of a quotation of Zermelo￿ s lecture in his
publications."
Steinhaus ([43], p. 460; italics added)
Why didn￿ t von Neumann refer, in 1928, to the Zermelo-tradition of alter-
nating games? The tentative answer to such a question is a whole research
program in itself and I will simply have to place it on an agenda and pass
on. I have no doubts whatsoever that any serious study to answer this almost
rhetorical question will reap a rich harvest of further cons perpetrated by the
mathematical economists, perhaps inadvertently. The point I wish to make is
something else and has to do with the axiom of choice and its place in economic
conning. So, let me return to this theme.
Mycielski (cf., [43], pp. 460-1) formulated the Zermelo minimax theorem in



























Now, summarizing the structure of the game and taking into account My-
cielski￿ s formulation in terms of alternating we can state as follows:
1. The sequential moves by the players can be modelled by alternating exis-
tential and universal quanti￿ers.
2. The existential quanti￿er moves ￿rst; if the total number of moves is odd,
then an existential quanti￿er determines the last chosen integer; if not,
the universal quanti￿er determines the ￿nal integer to be chosen.
3. One of the players tries to make a logical expression, preceded by these
alternating quanti￿ers true; the other tries to make it false.
4. Thus, inside the braces the win condition in any play is stated as a propo-
sition to be satis￿ed by generating a number belonging to a given set.
5. If, therefore, we can extract an arithmetical form - since we are dealing
with sequences of natural numbers - for the win condition it will be possible
to discuss recursive solvability, decidability and computability of winning
strategies.
The above de￿nitions, descriptions and structures de￿ne, therefore, an Arith-
metical Game of length n (cf. [48], pp. 125-6 for a formal de￿nition). Stating
the Zermelo theorem in a more formal and general form, we have:
16Discerning and knowledgeable readers will recognize, in this formulation, the way G￿del
derived undecidable sentences.
16Theorem 20 Arithmetical Games of ￿nite length are determined.
The more general theorem, for games of arbitrary (non-￿nite) length, can
be proved by standard diagonalization arguments and is17:
Theorem 21 Arithmetical Games on any countable set or on any set which
has a countable complement is determined.
Now, enter the axiom of choice! Suppose we allow any unrestricted sets ￿ and
￿: Then, for example if they are imperfect sets18, the game is not determined. If
we work within ZFC, then such sets are routinely acceptable and lead to games
that cannot be determined - even if we assume perfect information and perfect
recall. Surely, this is counter-intuitive? For this reason, this tradition in game
theory chose to renounce the axiom of choice and work with an alternative axiom
that restricts the class of sets within which arithmetical games are played. The
alternative axiom is the axiom of determinacy, introduced by Steinhaus:
Axiom 22 The Axiom of Determinacy: Arithmetical Games on every sub-
set of the Baire line19 is determined.
The motivation given by Steinhaus ([43], pp. 464-5) is a salutary lesson
for mathematically minded economists or economists who choose to accept the
axiom of choice on ￿ democratic￿principles or economists who are too lazy to
study carefully the economic meaning of accepting a mathematical axiom:
"It is known that [the Axiom of Choice] produces such conse-
quences as the decomposition of a ball into ￿ve parts which can be
put together to build up a new ball of twice the volume of the old
one [the Banach-Tarski paradox], a result considered as paradoxical
by many scientists. There is another objection: how are we to speak
of perfect information for [players] A and B if it is impossible to
verify whether both of them think of the same set when they speak
of ["￿"]? This impossibility is inherent in every set having only [the
Axiom of Choice] as its certi￿cate of birth. In such circumstances it
is doubtful whether human beings will ever play really [an in￿nite
game].
All these considerations impelled me to place the blame on the
Axiom of Choice. Sixty years of the theory of sets have elapsed since
this Axiom was proclaimed, and some ideas have .... convinced me
that a purely negative attitude against [the Axiom of Choice] would
be dangerous to propose. Thus I have chosen the idea of replacing
[the Axiom of Choice] by the [above Axiom of Determinacy].
italics added.
17The real time paradox of implementing an in￿nite play is easily resolved (cf., [43], pp.
465; [48], chapter 7).
18A set F is a perfect set if it is a closed set in which every point is a limit point.
19A Baire line is an irrational line which, in turn, is a line obtainable from a continuum by
removing a countable dense subset.
17There is a whole tradition of game theory, beginning at the beginning, so to
speak, with Zermelo, linking up, via Rabin￿ s modi￿cation of the Gale-Stewart
in￿nite game, to recursion theoretic formulations of arithmetical games under-
pinned by the axiom of determinacy and completely independent of the axiom
of choice and eschewing all subjective considerations. In this tradition
notions of e⁄ective playability, solvability and decidability questions take on
fully meaningful computational and computable form where one can investi-
gate whether it is feasible to instruct a player, who is known to have a winning
strategy, to actually select a sequence to achieve the win.
3 Towards Unconventional Computational Mod-
els in Economic Theory
I am not in any way competent in any form of unconventional models of com-
putation. The remarks below should, therefore, be taken as re￿ ections of a
Computable Economist who is deeply committed to making economics algo-
rithmically meaningful so that computation and experimentation can be seri-
ously and rigorously underpinned in the honest mathematics of the computer,
whether digital or analog.
My original motivation for coining the term Computable Economics, to en-
capsulate the kind of issues raised by Arrow and Stone, mentioned in the opening
section, was quite a di⁄erent kind of perplexity. It was a perplexity grounded
in proof theory and model theory20. There is no better way to summarize these
originating concerns, from the perspective of a Computable Economist, than to
recall two deep and subtle caveats added by two of the pioneers of computabil-
ity theory, Alonzo Church and Emil Post, in their pathbreaking contributions
to the origins of classical and higher recursion theory. Their insights suggested
a deeper interplay between computability and constructivity than is normally
understood or acknowledged by any of the social scientists now deeply immersed
in developing the frontiers of computable economics, algorithmic game theory
and algorithmic statistics.
To place these insights in the context of the present paper, let me state a
conjecture in the form of a theorem21:
Theorem 23 Nash equilibria of ￿nite games are constructively indeterminate22.
20To a large extent in their incarnation as constructive and non-standard analysis.
21These thoughts were inspired entirely by a reading of a fundamental series of results by
Francisco Doria and his collaborators (cf. [10] and [11]), which introduced me to Harrop￿ s
important work ([15]). These papers put in proper perspective my initial proof- and model-
theoretic perplexities when faced with assumptions and proofs in mathematical economics.
22The proof of the existence of Nash equilibria, given in standard textbooks, rely on one or
another of the nonconstructive ￿x point theorems (Brouwer￿ s, Kakutani￿ s etc.). Since these,
in turn, are proved invoking the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, which is intrinsically non-
constructive, due to essentially undecidable disjunctions, the proof of the non-constructivity
of Nash equilibria for general in￿nite games is ￿ easy￿￿and ￿ cheap￿￿at least from one point
of view.
18Proof. Apply Harrop￿ s Theorem ([15], p.136).
To make sense of this ￿ theorem￿ , and its proof using ￿ Harrop￿ s Theorem￿ , it
is necessary to understand the subtle di⁄erences between computability as un-
derstood in (classical) recursion theory, accepting Church￿ s Thesis23 and com-
putations by algorithmic mathematics as speci￿ed in varieties of constructive
mathematics, particularly intuitionistic constructive mathematics. I shall not
enter into the deep domain of the foundations of mathematics and its thorny
controversies here - although I, too, have my view and take my ￿ sides￿and ￿nd
myself, as always, in the minority! The subtle issues that have to be clari￿ed, to
make sense of the above almost counter-intuitive ￿ theorem￿ , were made clear in
Charles Parson￿ s ￿ review￿ , [30] of Harrop￿ s result24. The issues are the bearing
of Harrop￿ s Theorem on, whether:
1. Every ￿nite set is recursive;
2. Every recursive set is e⁄ectively decidable;
3. Every ￿nite set is e⁄ectively decidable;
This neat three-point characterization of Harrop￿ s theorem, by Parsons, is
a summary of the following explanation of the implications of his Theorem by
Harrop himself:
"Although it is correct to classically to state that the values of a
partial function computed by a machine of arbitrary G￿del number
form of a ￿nite set or an in￿nite set, this statement should not be
used together with the statements that every ￿nite set is recursive
and that every recursive set has an intuitively e⁄ective test for mem-
bership (converse of Church￿ s thesis) to conclude that if we know
classically that a certain integer is the G￿del number of a machine
which computes a function with a ￿nite range then automatically
there is an intuitively e⁄ective test for membership of that range.
Our theorem shown that as far as the general case is concerned there
is no recursive method for obtaining machines which will compute
the characteristic functions which would all individually be obtain-
able if there were such intuitively e⁄ective tests. There may in any
particular case be an intuitively e⁄ective test."
ibid, p.139; italics added.
Now how this links up with the early contributions by Church and Post
to the de￿ning frameworks for classical and higher recursion theory, can easily
be gauged by two caveats they made in two of their classic writings ([5], [32],
respectively). Church observed (ibid, p. 351):
23Or the Church-Turing Thesis.
24And the subsequent development and simpli￿cation of Harrop￿ s result and proof by Ji￿ r￿
Ho￿ rje￿([16]).
19"It is clear that for any recursive function of positive integers
there exists an algorithm using which any required particular value
of the function can be e⁄ectively calculated."
To this almost innocuous observation ￿￿ innocuous￿at least to the modern
￿ classical￿recursion theorist ￿Church added the subtle (I almost wrote ￿ slightly
devious￿￿but no one can possibly accuse Alonzo Church of being ￿ devious￿!!)
caveat:
"The reader may object that this algorithm cannot be held to
provide an e⁄ective calculation of the required particular values





i) = ki will ultimately be found. But if so this
merely means that he should take the existential quanti￿er which
appears in our de￿nition of a set of recursion equations in a con-
structive sense. What the criterion of constructiveness shall be is
left to the reader."
ibid, p.351, footnote 10; italics added.
Post, analogously, ￿rst sates what may seem obvious to a modern
￿ classical￿recursion theorist ([32], p. 469; italics in the original):
"Clearly, any ￿nite set of positive integers is recursive. For if
n1;n2;:::::;n￿ are the integers in question, we can test n being, not
being, in the set by directly comparing it with n1;n2;:::::;n￿."
But, then, goes on with his caveat:
"The mere25 existence of a general recursive function de￿ning
the ￿nite set is in question. Whether, given some de￿nition of the
set, we can actually discover what the members thereof are, is a
question for a theory of proof rather than for the present theory of
￿nite processes. For sets of ￿nite sets the situation is otherwise, ...
."
ibid, p.469, footnote 10; italics added.
Harrop￿ s theorem￿ s clari￿es these caveats and drives the wedge between com-
putabilty, classically understood, and algorithms as understood by (at least)
some constructivists. I believe this ￿ wedge￿allows the Computable Economist
to seek ￿ unconventional models of computation￿￿i.e., going beyond or, at least,
sideways from, the phenomenological limits imposed by the Church-Turing The-
sis.
Whether the institutions and mechanisms of a market economy make feasible
such ￿ unconventional models of computation￿ , depending on the ￿ wedge￿between
the Church-Turing Thesis and its ￿ converse￿ , is not something that is formally
25I suspect a reading of this sentence by replacing ￿ mere￿with ￿ very￿will make the sense
more accurate!
20decidable ￿let alone algorithmically decidable. But that does not mean the
market mechanism is not actually involved in ￿ unconventional computation￿ .
However, to make sense of this question it will be necessary to algorithmise
orthodox economic theory - or, even better, develop an algorithmic economics,
ab initio. To this extent I ￿nd it sobering to contemplate on an analogy between
the lessons to be learned from Abel￿ s impossibilities ￿and G￿del￿ s:
"Why was it that, in His in￿nite wisdom, God should have created alge-
braic solutions for general equations of the ￿rst four degrees, but not for
the equation ax5 + bx4 + cx3 + dx2 + ex + f = 0? Is it the case that
human powers are too limited to understand such a transcendent matter?
Or have we simply not yet ascended to the ￿ meta-mathematical￿level in
which comprehension will be forthcoming? If Abel￿ s proof was spared
such conundrums G￿del￿ s theorem unfortunately was not;.... . For while
G￿del￿ s theorem looks like ￿and was initially intended to be seen as ￿
a closure, it has been widely interpreted as a transitional impossibility
proof."
[39], p.167; italics in original
The ￿ fallacy of composition￿that drives a felicitous wedge between micro
and macro, between the individual and the aggregate, and gives rise to emergent
phenomena in economics, non-algorithmic ways ￿as conjectured, originally more
than a century and a half ago ￿by John Stuart Mill ([25]) and George Herbert
Lewes ([20]), and codi￿ed by Lloyd Morgan in his Gi⁄ord Lectures ([21]) ￿may
yet be tamed by unconventional models of computation.
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